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Louisiana's Conflicts Codification: Some Empirical
Observations Regarding Decisional Predictability
Patrick J Borchers*
I. INTRODUCTION
Of all of Professor Symeonides's accomplishments during his tenure at the
Louisiana State University Law Center, perhaps the one with the greatest public
impact was serving as the Reporter for the Louisiana State Law Institute's
preparation of a draft bill to comprehensively codify the state's conflicts law.' That
bill, unanimously passed by both houses of the Louisiana Legislature, became law
for cases filed as of January 1, 1992.2 The Louisiana conflicts codification is not
your father's conflicts statute. Sleek and modem, it represents a serious effort to
consolidate the gains of the conflicts revolution.
It also provides a unique opportunity in the United States to study the
advantages and disadvantages of comprehensive statutory solutions to conflicts
problems. While conflicts codifications are fairly common abroad-particularly in
countries with a civil law heritage3-Louisiana (doubtlessly motivated in part by its
civil law heritage4) is the first American jurisdiction to undertake such an endeavor.
Louisiana makes an interesting laboratory for the further reason that for the nineteen
years preceding the codification, it mostly followed a modem common law conflicts
approach derived from Professor Currie's writings and the Second Conflicts
Restatement.' Thus, if one were to look at Louisiana choice-of-law decisions
immediately preceding and following the codification, one might find clues as to
whether comprehensive conflicts statutes could benefit other states.
In this article, I endeavor to begin that task. I selected the project of measuring
the affirmance rate in Louisiana by appellate courts of trial court conflicts decisions
before and after the codification. As discussed more extensively below, I chose to
look at affirmance rates because they are a reasonable proxy for decisional
predictability. A higher affirmance rate (and correspondingly a lower reversal rate)
probably indicates greater decisional predictability. Correspondingly, a lower
affirmance rate (and correspondingly a higher reversal rate) probably indicates less
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
* Dean and Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. B.S., University of Notre
Dame, 1983; J.D., University of California, Davis, 1986.
1. See Symeon C. Symeonides,Louisiana Conflicts Law: Two "Surprises, " 54 La. L. Rev. 497,
503 n.30 (1994).
2. 1991 La. Acts No. 923, § 1. The law is codified in a new Book IV of the Civil Code. See
La. Civ. Code arts. 3515-3549.
3. See Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisiana's New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An
Exegesis, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 677, 689-90 (1992) (noting Swiss, Austrian and German conflicts
codifications).
4. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 497-98.
5. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 498-502.
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predictability, and brings with it greater incentives for parties to appeal adverse
decisions, and with that higher litigation costs (and transaction costs generally), as
well as greater costs imposed on the judicial system and thus, the public at large.
As reported in detail below, for the pre-codification cases that I sampled, the
affirmance rate was 52.9%, which is statistically indistinguishable from a coin flip.
For post-codification decisions, however, the affirmance rate improved to 76.2%.
Any statistical analysis has inherent limitations. While the sample size is large
enough that the before-and-after rates do not fall within a standard deviation of each
other, more data is needed before one can say with virtual certainty that the
Louisiana codification has produced an improved affirmance rate. Moreover, I do
not mean to suggest that merely analyzing case results in terms of affirmances and
reversals can ever provide the complete picture. Nonetheless, the results are
hopeful and suggest that comprehensive conflicts codifications can produce
significant benefits.
II. LOUISIANA CONFUCTS LAW: BEFORE AND AFTER
Beginning with the Louisiana Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Jagers v.
Royal Indemnity Co., Louisiana became a pretty typical "modem" conflicts
jurisdiction. Jagers-a case involving the application of intrafamilial immunity-
seemed to adopt interest analysis,7 at least in the case of loss-allocating tort rules in
which the contesting parties are all domiciled in the same state. These sorts of
cases, conventionally called false conflicts,' are the most appealing for departing
from the conventional state-of-the-injury rule in tort cases, and account for many
instances in which states have gone modem.9 Jagers, however, cited the Second
Conflicts Restatement as well. As things eventually developed in Louisiana, courts
took to applying interest analysis for the purpose of identifying so-called "false
conflicts," but then applying the Second Conflicts Restatement in the event that the
case was not a false conflict.'0
One of the charges that is often brought against such methodologies is that they
are radically uncertain in their operation." Interest analysis itself is notoriously
vulnerable to the criticism that what counts as an "interest" is neither self-evident
nor well understood by courts,'2 and the Second Restatement (particularly for torts
6. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
7. Id. at 311-12. See also Harvey Couch, Louisiana Adopts Interest Analysis: Applause and
Some Observations, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
8. See Symeonides, supra note 1, at 499 n.13.
9. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Babcock v. Jackson, 191
N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
10. See, e.g., Clark v. Favalora, 722 So. 2d 82,85 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998).
11. See, e.g., Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice 109-10, 156 (1993);
Scott Fruehwald, A Multilateralist Method of Choice of Law, 85 Ky. L.J. 347, 372 (1997).
12. See Patrick J. Borchers, Back to the Past: Anti-Pragmatism in American Conflicts Law, 48
Mercer L. Rev. 721,724 (1997); Juenger, supra note 11, at 121-23; Michael H. Gottesman, Draining
the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GeO. L.J. 1, 12 (1991).
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conflicts) is generally only relied upon for its open-ended, "grab-bag" provisions, 3
which are popular with courts but woefully indeterminate. 4 There are suggestions,
old and new, that such free-form methodologies may be heaping higher-than-
necessary costs on parties and taxing judicial resources.' If, then, such methodolo-
gies suffer this vice, there is little reason to think that pre-codification Louisiana
would have been atypical.'
All this changed in Louisiana for cases filed beginning in 1992. Of course, one
might ask whether there is any reason to think that the new codification is more
determinate than the old system. Louisiana's codification is not, to be sure, laced
with hard-and-fast rules. For instance, Article 3544, a general torts provision,
states:
Issues pertaining to loss distribution and financial protection are
governed, as between a person injured by an offense or quasi-offense and
the person who caused the injury, by the law designated in the following
order:
(1) If, at the time of the injury, the injured person and the person who
caused the injury were domiciled in the same state, by the law of that state.
Persons domiciled in states whose law on the particular issue is substan-
tially identical shall be treated as if domiciled in the same state.
(2) If, at the time of the injury, the injured person and the person who
caused the injury were domiciled in different states: (a) when both the
injury and the conduct that caused it occurred in one of those states, by the
law of that state; and (b) when the injury and the conduct that caused it
occurred in different states, by the law of the state in which the injury
occurred, provided that (i) the injured person was domiciled in that state,
(ii) the person who caused the injury should have foreseen its occurrence
in that state, and (iii) the law of that state provided for a higher standard
13. See. e.g., Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 6, 145 (1971).
14. Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some Observations and
an Empirical Note, 56 Md. L. Rev. 1232 (1997) (courts applying the Second Restatement are much
more likely to cite its general provisions than its more specific ones).
15. Juenger, supra note 11, at 121-23; Gottesman, supra note 12, at 12; Friedrich K. Juenger,
Choice of Law: How it Ought Not To Be, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 757, 760-61 (1997). A recent article
makes this point forcefully. See William H. Allen & Erin A. O'Hara, Second Generation Law and
Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter's Comparative Impairment and Beyond, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1011
(1999). Allen's and O'Hara's point that certain aspects of the modem methodologies (in particular the
version of interest analysis followed by Califomia) generate inefficiencies seems confirmed by the data
reported below. See also Erin O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Interest Groups, Contracts and Interest
Analysis, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 765,765 (1997) ("Interest analysis does not stand up well under economic
analysis.").
16. Louisiana might have been slightly out of the ordinary in having, even pre-codification, a
more extensive than average network of statutes that arguably applied to conflicts problems. See
Symeonides, supra note 1, at 498-99. However, "[flrom the beginning, Louisiana courts assumed a
lack of statutory authority [in conflicts matters] and proceeded to develop jurisprudential rules,
borrowed mostly from sister states." Id. at 499.
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of financial protection for the injured person than did the law of the state
in which the injurious conduct occurred.'
This statute should, at least in some cases, reach results similar to those
expected to be reached under the modem approaches. It is not tied to the state of
the injury or any other single connecting factor. It also contains terms that are open
to debate in a significant number of cases. For instance, determining whether tort
rules involve "loss distribution" is possible in most instances, but is not an
enterprise that is always free from doubt.'" The same could be said for determining
when the laws of the connected states are "substantially identical" or when the
tortfeasor "should have foreseen" the injury being caused.
But, from the standpoint of predictability, there are many reasons to be
optimistic that such a statute will be an improvement over the pre-existing
approach. For one, it gives litigants and courts an indisputably authoritative text in
which to turn. When contrasting a statute with the judicially invented ap-
proaches-which rely upon a confusing amalgamation of law review articles, cases
from other states, quotations from Restatements and the like--one ought not
underestimate the benefits of having, at the very least, a commonly understood
starting point for analyzing multistate problems. Another reason to be sanguine that
such a statute will improve predictability is that even with some open-ended
terminology, the universe of competing considerations is restricted. If, say, a case
under Article 3544 were to turn upon whether the locus of the injury was "foresee-
able," at least all concerned could address themselves to that question. By contrast,
with the judicially invented approaches, one only need survey the cases briefly to
discover that there is intense debate as to what counts as an "interest" in any
particular case.2°
Of course, speculation on these matters accomplishes little. The question to
which I now turn is whether one can measure any impact on predictability made by
the codification.
III. METHODOLOGY
Attempting to measure anything as elusive as decisional predictability is a
difficult task. I settled on attempting to measure the affirmance rates by appellate
courts of trial court choice-of-law decisions. I decided on looking at affirmance
(and by implication reversal) rates, because they are a reasonable proxy for
predictability. If the trial court and the appellate court agree on the result, even
though the losing party thought it worth the trouble to prosecute an appeal, this is
17. La. Civ. Code art. 3544.
18. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Return of Territorialism to New York's Conflicts Law: Padula
v. Lilam Properties Corp., 58 AIb. L. Rev. 775 (1995) (suggesting that the distinction between conduct
regulation and loss allocation is essential and serviceable, but not always free from doubt).
19. The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Jagers is an excellent example. See Jagers v.
Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 311-13 (La. 1973).
20. Juenger, supra note 11, at 121-23; Gottesman, supra note 12, at 12.
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a systemic success. It shows that both of the neutral observers agreed on the result.
A reversal, however, is a systemic failure. If a trial court-presumably neutral in
its outlook and doing its level best to reach the "correct," non-reversible
result-fails in the task, this suggests that resolution of the issue was not apparent.
If so, the resolution of similar issues will not be apparent to contesting parties, and
thus will become a likely source of litigation. If over a large number of cases, one
system produces a higher affirmnance rate than the other, one ought be able to say,
with some confidence, that the system with the higher affirmance rate is the one that
produces more predictable results.
I make no claim, of course, that affirmance rates are perfect measures of
predictability. The decision as to whether to appeal is the losing party's. Losing
parties below might, for instance, routinely misjudge their chances of success on
appeal, thus producing higher-than-expected affrnance rates. Moreover, a losing
party may not take an appeal because of economic considerations, or may be
precluded from doing so by the lack of a final judgment or some other obstacle to
meaningful appellate review. Moreover, some sampling bias is inherent because
appellate courts do not publish all of their decisions, and the decisions they publish
tend to be in the closer cases-favoring reversals. However-and this is a critical
point-there is no reason to think these considerations were significantly different
in the period before and after the passage of Louisiana's conflicts codification. If,
for instance, the passage of the conflicts statute had been accompanied by some
other institutional change in appellate review (for instance, if appellate jurisdiction
had been dramatically expanded or contracted), then one might attribute any before-
and-after effect to that other change. But, since there was no such evident change
in Louisiana in 1992, a significant variation in affirmance rates in conflicts
decisions before and after the statute can probably be attributed to the statute.
Because the statute became effective for casesfiled after January 1, 1992, there
was a considerable period-of time during which both the old approach and the new
statute co-existed. In an effort to generate a reasonable sample size, I began by
looking at decisions from 1988 forward. All of the decisions from 1988 through
1991 were, of course, under the old system. Beginning in 1992 appellate decisions
under the new statute began to appear, and by now the statute governs substantially
all cases on appellate review.
There were, of course, some complications. First, I limited the study to choice-
of-law decisions of what one might call the "horizontal" variety. Paradigmatically,
these were cases in which two or more states were connected to the transaction, and
the question was which state law to apply. I chose these kinds of cases because they
are the ones that the new statute covers. Thus, I did not include "vertical" choice-
of-law cases, where the question was whether to apply, say, federal admiralty law
or state law.2 I did, however, include federal diversity cases to the extent that these
cases were making a horizontal choice (again, usually between two or more state
21. See, e.g., Coto v. J. Ray McDermott, S.A., 709 So. 2d 1023 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998).
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laws), because such courts are required to follow the conflicts law of the state in
which they sit.22
The question of what to count as an "affirmance" does not always admit of an
easy answer. Sometimes appellate decisions do not make clear how the trial court
ruled on the choice-of-law question, and sometimes trial courts themselves are not
clear as to how they ruled. If the trial court's ruling could not be discerned, I did
not include the case. Similarly, if the appellate court did not clearly rule on the
matter, I excluded such cases as well. 3 If a trial court made the wrong choice of
law, but wound up being affirmed on different grounds, I counted such cases as
reversals, because such an affirmance hardly counts as an endorsement of the trial
court's choice-of-law analysis.2 Conversely, if the trial court got the choice-of-law
issue right, but was reversed on other grounds, I counted such cases as
affirmances.
25
There were also occasional questions as to whether to count cases as pre or
post-codification. Occasionally such difficulties arose from ambiguous discussions
and timing of the cases.26 Another occasional problem was presented by cases (both
before and after the passage of the new statute) that were decided under other state
statutes that contained conflicts principles. 7 I sorted those cases by filing date.
Those filed before 1992 1 treated as pre-codification; those filed in 1992 and after
I treated as post-codification.
Finally, I cannot warrant that I found every case. I endeavored to find as many
as I could in order to make the sample size as large as possible. In the end, I can
say with some confidence that someone else engaging in the same task would
probably not agree with my classification of every case, but I am confident that any
fair effort to look at the cases would produce results similar to mine.
22. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941).
23. See, e.g., Roberts v. Energy Dev. Corp., 104 F.3d 782 (5th Cir. 1997) (remanding for further
consideration of conflicts issue).
24. See, e.g., Cherokee Pump & Equip. Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1994) (district
court erred in choice-of-law determination; affirmed on other grounds). Similarly, partial reversals-as
long as the reversal was on choice-of-law grounds-were treated as reversals. See, e.g., Piper v. Alamo
Rent-a-Car, Inc., 567 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
25. See, e.g., Bolton v. Tulane Univ. of Louisiana, 692 So. 2d 1113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997).
Bolton is actually a difficult case to assess in several respects. The trial court was reversed, but appears
to have correctly decided to apply Louisiana law, rather than the law of Mississippi as urged by Bolton.
The appellate opinion does not explicitly report the trial court's ruling, but the discussion of "course
and scope of employment" under Louisiana law (and its reversal of the trial court on that point) clearly
implies that the trial court chose Louisiana law.
26. The most difficult case in this regard was Levy v. Jackson, 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1993). Levy justifies its result both under the statute and the pre-existing law. However, the docket
number reported for the trial court decision shows that the case was filed in 1990, which makes the
statute inapplicable. I therefore counted Levy as a pre-codification case.
27. See, e.g., Dekeyser v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 706 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998)
(decided under statute specifically applicable to insurance contracts).
1066 (Vol. 60
PA TRICK J. BORCHERS
IV. THE RESULTS
My research ultimately produced thirty-four pre-codification cases, of which
eighteen were affirmances s and sixteen were reversals. 9 Post-codification, I found
twenty-one cases, sixteen of which were affirmances ° and five were reversals.31
In raw numbers, therefore, in pre-codification cases, the affirmance rate was
52.9% (0.529), and in post-codification cases, it was 76.2% (0.762). At first blush,
therefore, the new statute appears to have produced a substantial improvement in
the affirnance rate of conflicts cases.
28. America's Favorite Chicken Co. v. Cajun Enters, 130 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 1997); Dupre v.
Penrod Drilling Corp., 993 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1993); Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 979
F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1992); Peavey Co. v. MN Anpa, 971 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1992); Gates v. Claret,
945 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1991); Crase v. Astroworld, Inc., 941 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1991); Orthopedic &
Sports Injury Clinic v. Wang Labs., Inc., 922 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1991); Fallon v. Superior Chaircraft
Corp., 884 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1989); Wooton v. Pumpkin Air, Inc., 869 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1989);
Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. AIG Oil Rig of Texas, Inc., 846 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1988); Clark v. Favalora,
722 So. 2d 82 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1998); Dekeyser v. Automotive Cas. Ins. Co., 706 So. 2d 676 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1998); Hanks v. Shell Oil Co., 631 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994); National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Ward, 612 So. 2d 964 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Francis v. Travelers Ins. Co., 581 So.
2d 1036 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991); Pittman v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 559 So. 2d 879 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1990); Cohn v. Heymann, 544 So. 2d 1242 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Hanover Petroleum
Corp. v. Tenneco Inc., 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988).
29. Hollier v. Union Texas Petroleum, Corp., 972 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 579 So. 2d 443 (La. 1991); Ridings v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, Inc., 723 So.
2d 979 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998); Continental Eagle Corp. v. Tanner & Co. Ginning, 663 So. 2d 204 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1995); Partin v. Dolby, 652 So. 2d 670 (La. App. I st Cir. 1995); Sentilles v. Kwik-Kopy
Corp., 652 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Walnut Equip. Leasing Co. v. Moreno, 643 So. 2d 327
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1994); Reeves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); EM
Nominee Pshp. Co. v. Arkla Energy Resources, 615 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993); Levy v.
Jackson, 612 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993); Willett v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 594 So.
2d 966 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); State v. Fontenot, 587 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991); Kirby v.
Kirby, 579 So. 2d 508 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991); Piper v. Alamo Rent-a-Car, Inc., 567 So. 2d 175 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1990); Wilkins v. State, 526 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Jones v. Jones, 523 So.
2d 874 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
30. Woodfield v. Bowman, 193 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1999); Hodgen v. Forest Oil Corp., 87 F.3d
1512 (5th Cir. 1996); Duhon v. Union Pac. Resources Co., 43 F.3d 1011 (5th Cir. 1995); Coleman v.
Robinson, No. 98-CA-1874, 1999 WL 691887 (La. App. 4th Cir. Sept. 1, 1999); Nicholas v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1999); Drew v. Martello, 729 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1999); De Nunez v. Bartels, 727 So. 2d 463 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1998); Kanz v. Wilson, 703 So. 2d 1331
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1997); Shell Oil Co. v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 701 So. 2d 1038 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1997); Bolton v. Tulane Univ. of Louisiana, 692 So. 2d 1113 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1997); Trautman v.
Poor, 685 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996); Rigdon v. Pittsburgh Tank & Tower Co., 682 So. 2d
1303 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Oliver v. Davis, 679 So. 2d 462 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996); Norwood v.
Craig, 658 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995); Sentilles Optical Servs. v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 395 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1995); Kennington v. H. Blume Johnson, Inc., 632 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
31. Cherokee Pump & Equip. Inc. v. Aurora Pump, 38 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1994); Salavarria v.
National Car Rental Sys., 705 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998); Anderson v. Oliver, 705 So. 2d 301
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1998); Norvell v. Norvell, 649 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995); Holcomb v.
Universal Ins. Co., 640 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1994).
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Because of the relatively small sample size, it is necessary to assess the
statistical significance of the results. The standard deviation for the pre-codification
results is 8.6% (0.086).32 Thus the true pre-codification affirmance rate, to within
one standard deviation, was 52.9% +/- 8.6%. The standard deviation on the post-
codification results was 9.3% (0.093). Thus, the true post-codification affirmance
rate, to within one standard deviation, was 76.2% +/- 9.3%. In other words-again,
to within one standard deviation-the pre-codification affirmance rate was between
44.3% and 61.5%; the post-codification affirmance rate was between 66.9% and
85.5%.




Affirmance Rate (Raw) 0.529 (52.9%) 0.762 (76.2%)
Standard Deviation +/- 0.086 (8.6%) +/- 0.093 (9.3%)
True Value (to one std. dev.) 44.3% x 5 61.5% 66.9% : x : 85.5%
V. DATA ANALYSIS
The data is, therefore, supportive of the hypothesis that the Louisiana conflicts
codification has improved the affirmance rate, and by implication the predictability
of decisions in conflicts cases. Moreover, the results show a surprisingly low
affirmance rate (and thus high reversal rate) in pre-codification cases. In statistical
terms, before the codification, a trial court's decision had no more predictive value
than flipping a coin. In fact, perversely, trial court performance would not have
worsened statistically if trial courts had tried to get the wrong result. After the
32. The formula for calculating the standard deviation is the square root of the mean times one
minus the mean divided by the total number of samples. See R. Mark Sirkin, Statistics for the Social
Sciences 120 (1995). For the pre-codification results, this was the square root of: (0.529 x 0.471)/
34. The result is thus .086. Other standard deviations were calculated in the same way.
This formula is consistent with the common-sense notion that the larger the sample size, the more
reliable the results. Consider, for example, an observer w'io sees two players shooting basketball free
throws. If Player A attempts two free throws and succeeds on one of them, and Player B attempts three
and succeeds on two, Player B would have the higher percentage at that point, but that data would be
so limited as to give one little confidence that Player B is really the better free throw shooter.
However-to use the data generated here-if Player A attempts 34 free throws and succeeds on 18, and
Player B attempts 21 and succeeds on 16, one would have considerably greater confidence that Player
B is really the better free throw shooter.
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codification, the affirmance rate improved to the point that a trial court's determina-
tion indisputably was well to the high side of 50% mark for predictive value.
There are limitations to this study and any like it. First, one should not make
too much of the absolute numbers. Because reported appellate opinions usually
come in close cases, the predictability problem pre-codification was probably not
as bad as the 47.2% reversal rate might lead one to believe. It would also be
desirable to have more data because a larger base brings more reliability.
Nonetheless, one can say with considerable confidence that the affirmance rate has
improved post-codification.3
VI. CONCLUSION
The modem common law approaches to conflicts problems are vulnerable to
criticism on the grounds that they provide insufficient decisional predictability and
all of the attendant costs that come with a lack ofpredictability. In this essay I have
endeavored to explore whether a comprehensive conflicts statute such as Louisi-
ana's can improve predictability. The answer, based on the data available, appears
to be "yes."
Of course, there are other values at stake in multistate cases. One can imagine
silly, but highly predictable, methods for deciding conflicts cases. Professor Currie
once proposed (I hope in jest, but it is difficult to tell) that certain kinds of conflicts
cases be decided by choosing the law of the state first in alphabetical order.34 Such
a system would so undermine confidence in the fair administration of justice that
almost any other system (no matter how unpredictable) would be preferable.
Predictability is, however, an important value in the law, and an important
value in conflicts cases. To the extent that legal rules affect primary behavior,
predictability is nearly essential. The lender who takes a security interest in
personal or real property needs to know with a high degree of certainty how to
perfect his interest against third parties, and can know this only if he knows what
law will apply to the transaction. 5 If he cannot reasonably predict what law will
33. The confidence that one can have in the results actually turns out to be a complicated and
interesting question. Recall that the standard deviations were calculated according to the formula for
binary statistics. See Sirkin, supra note 32, at 120. Assuming a normal distribution, a width of one
standard deviation covers 68% of the bell curve. Thus, the probability that the true mean lies beyond
one standard deviation is 32% (0.32). Assuming again a normal distribution, the probability that the
true mean lies to the high side is 16% (0.16), and to the low side is also 16% (0.16). Because the data
here shows that the pre- and post-codification affirmance rates do not fall within one standard deviation
of each other, in order for them to actually be identical, the true post-codification rate would have to
be on the low side, and the true pre-codification rate be on the high side. There are independent events,
each with a probability of no more than 16% (0.16). Applying the rule of multiplication of pro-
babilities, see id. at 237, the probability that both would occur is less than 0.0256. In other words, there
is less than a 3% probability that the true means are actually identical. Thus, one can have better than
97% confidence that the post-codification affirmance rate is higher than the pre-codification rate.
34. Brainerd Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 608-10 (1963).
35. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests and Other
Liens in International Bankruptcies, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 165 (Supp. 1998).
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apply, transactions of this kind would become either more expensive or extinct.
Even when the applicable legal rules are unlikely to affect primary behavior (as in
the case of loss allocating tort rules), predictability is still an important value,
because as long as choice of law remains a wild card, parties are less likely to be
able to voluntarily resolve their cases, and the costs (both on the parties and on the
public) will increase. The Louisiana conflicts codification, the fruit of Professor
Symeonides's deft efforts as its Reporter, is a hopeful indication that statutory
solutions can allow for the reconciliation of predictability and other values in
multistate cases.
